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I 
INTRODUCTION 
I had the good fortune to be one of Marc Galanter’s students. From 1989 to 
1995, I was a doctoral student in sociology at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. I had gotten my law degree in 1980, practiced law and mediation, and 
then decided to get a doctoral degree as a foundation for an academic career 
focusing on dispute resolution. In my second semester at Wisconsin, I took 
Galanter’s “Sociology and Law” course, which was cross-listed in the Law 
School and Sociology Departments. I had previously read his Why the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead article1 and knew that he was a leading figure in the law-and-
society world. He had been interested in dispute resolution and decided to focus 
the entire course on various aspects of dispute resolution. He assigned a lot of 
reading, which provided me with a wonderful introduction to the socio-legal 
literature on dispute resolution. 
I made a wise decision in this course, which had a major impact on my 
career. The course required students to write a paper and, early in the semester, 
I made an appointment to meet with Professor Galanter to discuss possible 
paper topics. Since I was interested in dispute resolution generally, I was open 
to writing about many different things. I asked if he was working on anything in 
which my research could be helpful. I was offering, in effect, to be an unpaid 
research assistant. I figured that he would be more interested in my work if I 
wrote about something he was already interested in. In addition, he would 
presumably pick a more significant topic than I would have on my own. 
My plan worked. Galanter described several different pieces he was working 
on and I quickly decided to focus on what he called “private courts.” He 
suggested that I research court-annexed arbitration, private judging, 
organizational tribunals “embedded” within private organizations, private 
tribunals organized to handle complaints by outsiders, and independent 
professional service providers. I wrote a decent paper (which got an “A”) but, 
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 1. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 148 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:147 
more importantly, I started developing a relationship with Marc. He was 
incredibly generous to me. I was not even expecting an acknowledgment in a 
footnote in his article but he made me a coauthor.2 Our article was translated 
into Japanese and he got a $500 honorarium, which he split with me. Again, I 
was not expecting this and did not feel it was necessary (though I certainly 
appreciated it, as I was living on a graduate-student budget). 
During my time at Wisconsin, Marc was the director of the Institute of Legal 
Studies and he arranged for a Hewlett Fellowship for me, employed me as a 
research assistant, and served on my dissertation committee. He was a member 
of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Wisconsin and arranged for the court to hire me to 
develop a dispute resolution pamphlet and directory. He also helped me get a 
fellowship at the Harvard Program on Negotiation, which enabled me to finish 
my dissertation. His scholarship profoundly influenced my work and I am proud 
to write this appreciation as one of his students.3 
This brief essay highlights three of his works to illustrate qualities that seem 
especially worth emulating.4 It includes extended excerpts of his writing because 
 
 2. See Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 12 STUD. IN LAW, POL. 
& SOC’Y 393 (1992). In fact, about forty percent of the text in the article came from my paper. I was 
involved in editing the entire article, but he generated the main ideas and did most of the work, so I did 
not expect any credit. In another example of his scholarly generosity, he delayed publishing my phrase 
“process pluralism,” which he encountered reading my dissertation, until I had a publication he could 
cite. 
 3. I dedicated my first law-review article to Marc Galanter. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering 
and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 839 n.* (1997) [hereinafter 
Lande, Lawyering and Mediation Practices]. More recently, I published a critical appreciation of 
Galanter’s work focusing especially on his “vanishing trial” thesis. See John Lande, Shifting the Focus 
From the Myth of “The Vanishing Trial” to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I Learned 
Almost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution From Marc Galanter, 6 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 191 (2005) [hereinafter Lande, I Learned Almost Everything From Marc Galanter]. 
In my biography accompanying the article, I wrote, 
Though this essay quibbles with a few aspects of [Marc Galanter’s] Vanishing Trial Report, I 
write this with great affection and admiration for his tremendous contribution to our 
understanding of conflict resolution. I include extensive cites to and quotes of his scholarship 
to introduce readers to it (or remind them of it). 
Id. at 191 n.*. My own scholarship certainly has been influenced by his writing. I remember him 
advising me, as a graduate student, to avoid being either a Cassandra of doom or an uncritical 
cheerleader about alternative dispute resolution, which is advice I still try to follow. Although there are 
some differences between our perspectives, I share his views, values, and tastes highlighted in this 
essay. Of course, there were many influences on my career and I also especially appreciate Craig 
McEwen, Joe Sanders, and Mark Suchman as role models. 
 4. Galanter is a prolific writer and a renowned expert in many areas, including Indian Law, Jewish 
Law, civil justice, lawyers, legal culture, and dispute resolution, among others, as one can see from his 
website. See Marc Galanter, http://marcgalanter.net/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007). Thus these 
three writings reflect only a fraction of his scholarship. Because of space limitations, this essay focuses 
on only these publications. If I were to add one more, it would be his Justice in Many Rooms article, 
which provides an excellent framework of legal pluralism (describing how many legal regimes coexist 
simultaneously in the same society) and challenges the “legal centralist” perspective, a problematic 
worldview that dominates the legal academy. See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, 
Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981). 
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his concepts and language are so evocative that paraphrasing often does not do 
them justice. 
II 
WHY THE “HAVES” COME OUT AHEAD 
Galanter’s classic article, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change,5 was my first introduction to his writing. I went 
to law school in the late 1970s to learn how to use law to promote social justice. 
The title of the article made it a must-read for me. Although some might have 
expected a polemic criticizing injustice caused by inequality, the article provides 
a cool analysis of mechanisms causing and reinforcing inequality in the legal 
system. Rather than follow conventional wisdom by focusing on differences in 
resources, Galanter identifies a key distinction between “one-shotters” and 
“repeat-players.”6 He follows—and helped develop—the law-and-society 
perspective that focuses particularly on how the legal system actually operates 
in daily life without assuming that actual operations perfectly mirror statements 
of the law by courts and legislatures.7 Thus, rather than relying primarily on 
formal legal authorities such as appellate opinions or statutes, his insights are 
based on empirical and journalistic accounts of a wide range of legal behaviors, 
including creditors’ use of small claims courts,8 automobile-insurance adjusters’ 
practices in handling insurance claims,9 prosecutors’ decisions about whether 
and how to charge defendants,10 relationships between automobile 
manufacturers and dealers,11 the propensity of Yugoslavian and Philippine 
citizens to use litigation,12 and on and on. His article provides an important 
analysis challenging a conventional wisdom that simply providing have-nots 
 
 5. Galanter, supra note 1. 
 6. See id. at 97–104. To illustrate the difference between one-shotters and repeat-players, he 
writes, “The sailor overboard and the shark are both swimmers, but only one is in the swimming 
business.” Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 363 (1975). He 
argues that there is overlap between repeat-player status and power, wealth, and social status, but that 
these are not identical. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 103. He shows how repeat players have advance 
intelligence (often from structuring the situation), expertise, economies of scale, ongoing relationships 
with key players, incentives to establish tough bargaining reputations, tolerance for risks in playing the 
odds in particular cases, and opportunities to litigate strategically to develop favorable precedents. See 
id. at 98–101, 125. 
 7. Galanter focuses on “effectiveness at the field level,” which he calls “penetration” of law, as 
distinguished from rules propounded by “peak agencies.” Galanter, supra note 1, at 97. The law-and-
society literature often refers to this as the distinction between “law on the books” and “law in action.” 
See Marc Galanter, The Portable Soc 2; or, What to Do until the Doctrine Comes, in GENERAL 
EDUCATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COLLEGE OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 246, 256–59 (J.J. MacAloon ed., 1992) (describing derivation of these 
concepts and analyzing strategies for dealing with the “gap” between the law on the books and law in 
action). 
 8. Galanter, supra note 1, at 99 n.9. 
 9. Id. at 99–100 n.13. 
 10. Id. at 101 n.16. 
 11. Id. at 102 n.19. 
 12. Id. at 104–05 n.22. 
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with more lawyers engaging in impact litigation to change legal rules would 
make a substantial difference in reducing inequality.13 Although such increased 
access to justice might help somewhat, he suggests that there would be 
substantially greater impact by organizing one-shotters into repeat-players and 
expanding lawyers’ roles beyond courtroom advocacy.14 
This article is also quite relevant to the dispute-resolution field, which has 
become the focus of my career. Even before the 1976 Pound Conference, which 
is often identified as the initiation of the modern alternative-dispute-resolution 
(ADR) movement,15 Galanter provided a more insightful analysis of 
alternatives to dispute resolution through court adjudication than that in much 
of our current scholarship.16 In Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, he focuses 
on the vast majority of legally oriented behavior, which occurs outside of 
court.17 He distinguishes truly private dispute resolution (such as inaction, self-
help, withdrawing from relationships, and intra-group processes) from 
settlement systems that are oriented or “appended” to official legal 
institutions.18 Moreover, he argues that disputing processes are not objects with 
fixed characteristics, but are malleable sets of interactions that people 
selectively shape and use.19 
III 
CASE CONGREGATIONS AND THEIR CAREERS 
Whereas Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead has rightly received great 
acclaim, Case Congregations and Their Careers20 has had a regrettably obscure 
scholarly career.21 This article is a gem that deserves more attention. It 
illustrates Galanter’s penchant for conceptualizing the legal system broadly and 
for reflecting complex interactions with the rest of social life. Rather than focus 
on individual cases as the unit of analysis in which cases are largely independent 
of each other, Case Congregations focuses on “congregations” of cases as the 
cases interact and the congregations evolve over time. Like a naturalist, 
 
 13. Id. at 114–19, 123–24, 149–51. 
 14. Id. at 149–51. 
 15. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at 
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 
309–10 (1996) (suggesting that the modern ADR movement dates back to the 1976 Pound Conference). 
 16. Galanter, supra note 1, at 124–35. 
 17. Id. In a later article, he coined the term “litigotiation,” which he defines as “the strategic 
pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court process.” Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using 
Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDU. 268 (1984). 
 18. Galanter, supra note 1, at 124–35. 
 19. Id. at 144–48. 
 20. Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 371 (1990). 
 21. A Westlaw search of the “journals and law review” database found more than 800 citations of 
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead. This understates the number of citations as the Westlaw library did 
not include many journals for much of the period following the article’s publication in 1974. There were 
467 cites for the ten years from 1997 through 2006, with a range of thirty-three to fifty-eight cites per 
year. By contrast, there have been only twenty-seven cites to Case Congregations in the same Westlaw 
database in more than sixteen years since its publication. 
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Galanter creates a taxonomy of cases with populations, families, and 
congregations of cases. He defines populations as sets of cases “that are very 
large and long-lasting, such as automobile-injury cases, divorce cases, and 
collection cases.”22 Families of cases are sets of “very closely related cases (for 
example, involving a single party or incident).”23 Finally, he defines a 
congregation as a “group of cases that are seen as a defined set that share 
common features, that are shaped by a common history, that are subject to 
shared contingencies, and that lean into a common future.”24 He contrasts 
congregations with populations. Populations are relatively enduring, stable, and 
sluggish, and cases in populations are not strongly affected by similar recent 
cases. Congregations, on the other hand, are smaller groups in which cases are 
subject to greater influence by preceding cases.25 He writes that “congregations 
are cultural categories, part of the culture of the regulars, created by an act of 
labeling, that in turn intensifies interaction and mutual influence.”26 
Having identified these classes of case aggregations, this modern Darwin of 
legal life proceeds to classify the evolutionary27 dynamics of the “congregation” 
class. He begins by rejecting the plausible assumption that the amount of 
litigation is closely related to the level of underlying social activity. For 
example, one might assume that the amount of personal injury litigation arising 
from automobile collisions would be correlated to the number of miles driven. 
Although this idea is intuitively appealing, Galanter marshals compelling 
evidence to show that it is conceptually problematic and empirically 
inaccurate.28 He identifies several classes of dynamics that do affect the careers 
of case congregations. “Endogenous” changes originate within case 
congregations,29 “holistic effects” result from actors treating cases as part of a 
set of cases rather than as independent units,30 and “career effects” reflect 
 
 22. Galanter, supra note 20, at 372 n.1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 372. He gives the following examples of congregations: 
The shared features that define the set may differ: a set may be connected by its origin in a 
specific event (e.g., a disaster like the Babylift crash, the Buffalo Creek flood, or the Hyatt 
Skywalk collapse; a particular form contract; or a financial incident). Or a set may be related 
to use of a particular product (e.g., the Dalkon Shield) or a particular type of product (e.g., all-
terrain vehicles [ATVs]). Or a set may represent a conjunction of a particular kind of party 
and doctrine (e.g., insurance bad faith) or of a particular right and a particular procedure (e.g., 
Title VII class actions). 
Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 373. 
 27. It is not quite accurate to use the analogy of biological evolution because changes in litigation 
phenomena result, in part, from humans’ strategic decisions. Galanter writes, “Case types are like soap 
operas. They change over time, as claimants are mobilized, lawyers specialize, knowledge accumulates, 
and so forth. Actors reflect on the sequence, estimating what is to come and investing according to their 
notions of advantage.” Galanter, supra note 20, at 386. 
 28. Id. at 373–78. 
 29. Id. at 379. 
 30. Id. at 384–85. 
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“changes in litigation behavior that result from the temporal sequence of similar 
litigation.”31 
The catalog of endogenous effects includes prevention of future harm and 
liability exposure,32 changes in legal “regimes” for handling problems,33 changes 
in recordkeeping practices affecting the production and retention of potential 
evidence,34 and “promotional effects” of changes in the legal system that 
encourage or discourage future litigation.35 Galanter identifies two holistic 
effects: “relativization,” whereby people evaluate individual cases “relative to 
the expected profile of the whole congregation, experienced and anticipated,”36 
and “rationing,” whereby “[s]carce resources are allocated to cases with an eye 
to the demands of the whole caseload.”37 
Galanter classifies various types of career effects. “Anticipation” effects 
occur when actors expect that early cases in a congregation will have substantial 
effects on later cases and act accordingly.38 “Information-sharing and 
coordination effects” result when “[l]awyers who have similar cases, especially 
ones that require elaborate preparation, . . . form networks for information 
sharing and strategic coordination.”39 The “depletion effect” occurs when the 
pool of readily actionable cases dries up due to a “complex mix of changes in 
rights, in procedures, in incentives, in actors, and in defendant responses.”40 A 
congregation’s odyssey is affected as lawyers gain expertise over time and there 
is turnover in lawyers working on cases in the congregation.41 “Outcome 
stabilization” occurs as congregations mature over time and the “outcomes 
become more predictable.”42 Using the metaphor of an evolving stream, 
Galanter summarizes the dynamics of case congregations this way: 
 
 31. Id. at 385–86. 
 32. Galanter, supra note 20, at 379–81. For example, “[p]roducts may be redesigned or 
withdrawn . . . ; hazards repaired or guarded, disclaimers made, or permissions sought.” Id. at 379. 
 33. Id. at 381–82. For example, processes for handling workplace injuries may be shifted from 
courts to workers’ compensation agencies, and legal causes of action can be created or eliminated. Id. 
 34. Id. at 382. For example, businesses may discourage employees from writing about matters that 
could be used as evidence in later litigation. Id. 
 35. Id. at 383–84. For example, if a court establishes a new cause of action or a plaintiff achieves a 
sensational victory, others may feel encouraged to follow suit. This dynamic can work both ways and 
thus depress litigation if would-be plaintiffs and their attorneys interpret legal changes as decreasing 
their chances for success. Id. 
 36. Id. at 385. To illustrate this dynamic, Galanter cites research indicating that “participants in 
larger riots received less severe sentences than participants in smaller riots.” Id. 
 37. Galanter, supra note 20, at 385. For example, when dealing with a substantial congregation of 
cases, lawyers and judges need to ration the amount of attention they can devote to individual cases. Id. 
 38. Id. at 386–87. For example, after a statute is enacted, parties may “over-invest” in litigation to 
establish favorable precedents for later cases. Id. 
 39. Id. at 387. 
 40. Id. at 388. The most obvious depletion effects occur when there are a limited number of 
claimants, such as the victims of a disaster, but this is also related to preventive effects resulting from 
defensive actions by potential defendants. Id. 
 41. Id. at 389. For example, “[a]ltruistic pioneers, strongly identified with their clients’ ‘cause’ may 
be displaced by profit-seekers who can afford to finance the cases.” Id. 
 42. Galanter, supra note 20, at 389–93. 
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As these examples remind us, a case congregation is not just a succession of cases in 
which each is measured against a fixed (or slowly changing) framework of law. 
Instead, it is a changing stream whose course shifts and turns, widens and deepens, 
diverts and quickens. Law, lawyers, parties, audiences, practices, institutions, 
outcomes, stakes, expectations, discourse, meanings—all of these may undergo change 
as one of these congregations runs its course.43 
One can fully appreciate Galanter’s conclusion in Case Congregations only 
by reading his words: 
We can, I think, identify many regularities in this process, many paths by which a 
variety of influences work. Whether these can be subsumed in a comprehensive 
master pattern seems doubtful. No one is in charge: a case congregation is “the 
product of the action of many men but . . . not the result of human design[.]” It is an 
interactive system that “utilize[s] the separate knowledge of all its several members, 
without this knowledge ever being concentrated in a single mind, or being subject to 
those processes of deliberate coordination and adaptation which a mind performs[.]” 
External events and the litigation system are simultaneously connected and separated 
by the strategies of the actors. External changes affect the litigation system as they are 
filtered through the strategic considerations of the parties. That is, we are dealing with 
a kind of behavior in which people are acting strategically; they are thinking about 
stakes, probable returns, and tactical options. This is not to say that their motives are 
solely economic. They may want vindication or revenge. They may be poorly informed 
or may miscalculate. But generally their behavior is not impulsive and irreversible: 
they recruit advisers and allies, ponder options, assess what the other side is doing, and 
act after some deliberation. So when we see changes in litigation over time, we see 
reflections of changes in the resources, alternatives, and strategies available to the 
players. 
To imagine the connection between the litigation system and the wider society, 
consider the following extended analogy. Imagine a strange variation of billiards in 
which when one player is shooting, the other can change slightly the position of the 
balls on the table. Imagine such a match being played on an immense table on which 
innumerable such games are taking place simultaneously. Games are playing through 
one another, so the balls in one match may ricochet unexpectedly from the strokes in 
another match. The surface of the table, rutted and torn by constant wear, changes 
imperceptibly between plays. Only part of the throng in the vast hall is intermittently 
diverted from other amusements to attend to the billiards table. Those who play and 
observe apply several overlapping and changing systems of keeping score. Tokens for 
play are distributed partly on the basis of recent scores but partly according to chance 
contact and intensity of interest. Would-be players press forward or depart on the 
basis of rumors about the course of play and the pull of rival entertainments. The 
changing band of players brings different combinations of agility, coordination, 
calculation, boldness, experience, and so forth. 
What would an observer perched above the table see? Balls colliding, deflected; 
energies dissipated and transmitted. The course of the balls is not random. Much of 
what happens can be traced to the moves of the players, and these moves can be 
understood as pursuit of their goals. Yet the overall pattern is not traceable to or 
deducible from the goals or strategies of any of the players. For each is surrounded by 
unknowable contingencies, including in part the cumulative effects of the actions of 
the others. Although the course of play is influenced by many things that happen in 
the hall—the composition of the crowd, the volume and appeal of the other 
amusements—it is not a direct reflection of any of these.44 
 
 43. Id. at 393. 
 44. Id. at 394–95 (citations omitted). 
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IV 
LOWERING THE BAR 
Galanter’s recent book, Lowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes and Legal 
Culture,45 is the culmination of much of his work on American law. Although he 
virtually never collects his own empirical data, he is an avid analyst of others’ 
data. Lowering the Bar is something of an exception as he provides what is 
almost certainly the most comprehensive analysis of the “corpus” of lawyer 
jokes, which he collected from all around the world and by going back through 
historical sources. At first thought, one might assume that there would be little 
value in analyzing lawyer jokes. Galanter easily demolishes that assumption, 
showing that “[j]okes provide a rough gauge of common attributions of traits to 
various social groups and perceptions of the stature of various sorts of 
behavior.”46 He has been working on this project since the early 1990s and has 
published at least a dozen articles using lawyer jokes as data.47 Although 
Galanter uses jokes and cartoons as his primary sources in Lowering the Bar, 
they are “juxtaposed with other outcroppings of legal culture—public opinion 
as expressed in surveys; the discourse about law among political, media, and 
business elites; and the portrayal of law and lawyers in the media.”48 He sorts 
the jokes into nine major categories, which “can be organized into two waves[:] 
an enduring core of topics and themes that have been well established for 
several centuries and a set of new thematic areas that have flourished since 
1980.”49 The enduring themes are that (1) lawyers are corrupters of discourse, 
who “lie incorrigibly,” (2) lawyers are greedy economic predators who do not 
produce anything of value but rather live off of productive members of society, 
(3) lawyers are allies of the devil, (4) lawyers are “aggressive, competitive hired 
guns, incurably contentious, unprincipled mercenaries who foment strife and 
conflict by encouraging individual self-serving and self-assertion rather than 
cooperative problem solving,” and (5) lawyers are “enemies of justice [who] are 
 
 45. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005). 
 46. Id. at 28. Galanter specifically addresses the question why lawyer jokes provide valuable 
information about legal culture. See id. at 26–28. Reading any chapter of the book demonstrates the 
value of the enterprise. 
 47. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and its 
Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (1998); Marc Galanter, Changing Legal Consciousness in 
America: The View from the Joke Corpus, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223 (2002); Marc Galanter, The 
Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647 (2000); 
Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political 
Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998); Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Laboratory Or, Can They Run 
Through Those Little Mazes?, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2001); Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: 
Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633 (1994) [hereinafter, Galanter, Predators and 
Parasites]; Marc Galanter, Tournament of Jokes: Generational Tension in Large Law Firms, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 1437 (2006); Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding 
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002) [hereinafter Galanter, Turn Against Law]. 
 48. GALANTER, supra note 45, at 5. He argues that the skeptical representation of lawyers in jokes 
is similar to views expressed in public-opinion polls. Id. at 250. 
 49. Id. at 17. 
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indifferent to justice and willingly lend their talents to frustrate it.”50 The jokes 
of recent vintage portray (1) lawyers as opportunistic betrayers of the trust—
not only of opponents, but also clients, partners, friends, and family, (2) lawyers 
as morally deficient, lacking normal human feelings and decency, (3) lawyers as 
objects of scorn, despised because of shared social contempt for them rather 
than for their deeds or character, and (4) celebration of the death or absence of 
lawyers, who constitute a social affliction.51 Galanter uses the jokes and other 
data to illustrate his thesis that in recent decades, social and business elites have 
cultivated a “jaundiced view” of the legal system: 
Our civil justice system was widely condemned as pathological and destructive, 
producing untold harm. A series of factoids or macro-anecdotes about litigation 
became the received wisdom: America is the most litigious society in the course of all 
human history; Americans sue at the drop of a hat; the courts are brimming over with 
frivolous lawsuits; resort to courts is a first rather than a last resort; runaway juries 
make capricious awards to undeserving claimants; immense punitive damage awards 
are routine; litigation is undermining our ability to compete economically. Although a 
litigious populace and activist judges were also blamed, lawyers, as the promoter, 
beneficiaries, and protectors of this pathological system, held pride of place among the 
culprits responsible.52 
In the concluding chapter of Lowering the Bar, Galanter considers whether 
his findings were unique to the United States and, after reviewing lawyer jokes 
and consulting with scholars and practitioners in Great Britain, Australia, India, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark, he finds that the legal culture and 
attitudes about lawyers are quite different in those countries.53 In the United 
States, 
[p]atterns of joking appear to track changes in the ubiquity and invasiveness of 
lawyers and law rather than a worsening of lawyer behavior . . . . In conjunction with 
growing resistance to regulation, taxes, and “big government” starting in the late 
1970s, many recoiled against what they viewed as the excessive reach and cost of law.54 
Collectively, the lawyer jokes capture a deep American ambivalence about the 
law and lawyers. Galanter concludes, 
Through this decentralized, endlessly receptive, and very expensive system, we 
attempt to pursue our multiple and colliding individual and social visions of 
substantive justice. We want our legal institutions to yield both comprehensive policy 
embodying shared public values and facilities for the relentless pursuit of individual 
interests. But we are suspicious of the concentrated authority required to provide the 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 17–18. 
 52. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted). Galanter has written numerous articles analyzing this jaundiced 
view or malaise. E.g., Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users, 
53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years 
War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005); Galanter, The Turn Against Law, supra note 47; Marc Galanter, An 
Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); 
Galanter, Predators and Parasites, supra note 47; Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased 
Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW (Walter Olson ed. 1988); Marc Galanter, The Legal Malaise; or, 
Justice Observed, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 537 (1985). 
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latter routinely to ordinary citizens. We prefer fragmented government and reactive 
legal institutions with limited resources, so that in large measure both the making of 
public policy and the vindication of individual claims are delegated to the parties 
themselves, who are left to fend according to their own resources. But lawyers, each 
attached to her own client, cannot fulfill the fatally divided promise of substantive 
justice. 
The lawyer joke corpus is a form in which strands of popular and elite resistance to the 
law come together. Both are anxious whether the society and world we live in are just. 
We each know that in this or that familiar corner of things, wrongdoers prosper and 
there is lots of undeserved and avoidable suffering. We would like to think that 
nevertheless somehow it all adds up, that each gets his deserts, that there is a cosmic 
balance in which virtue is rewarded and evil punished. But there is a nagging feeling 
that the wicked flourish.55 
V 
AN APPRECIATION OF MARC GALANTER’S SCHOLARSHIP 
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 
and Lowering the Bar illustrate many of the superlative qualities of Galanter’s 
scholarship. He is deeply committed to developing as accurate an understanding 
of legal phenomena as possible. He is like a data vacuum cleaner, collecting 
every source of relevant information he can put his hands on and generously 
giving credit to others’ work. His writing reflects insights from an incredibly 
broad range of sources, including government statistics, scholarly research, 
media accounts, public-opinion polls, popular culture, conversations with 
judges, legal practitioners and scholars, and even lawyer jokes. His work 
regularly challenges comfortable assumptions of conventional wisdom to 
produce realistic portraits of the legal world. He develops creative concepts and 
theories that help people see the world more clearly and frame future analyses. 
While resisting temptations to engage in polemics or ideological crusades, his 
work reflects a deep commitment to promoting his eclectic vision of the public 
good, with particular concern for the have-nots in our world. Although his 
writing is dense and complex at times, his language is full of wry, understated 
humor and colorful images that provide a multi-dimensional portrait of legal 
life. What does a better job of capturing the reality of the legal world than his 
metaphor of a grand and bizarre billiard-game spectacle?56 
No scholar provides a universal model of excellence, not even Marc 
Galanter. Readers may disagree with some of his analyses. (Perhaps worse, 
readers may agree with all of a writer’s views, suggesting that the scholarship 
may not be sufficiently original.) Scholars must develop their own voices and 
views to achieve their highest scholarly potential. Socio-legal scholars can 
benefit greatly by considering Galanter’s work as a model and by adapting 
some of his approaches. 
 
 55. Id. at 259 (footnotes omitted). 
 56. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
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I have chosen this path and I am proud to be one of Marc Galanter’s 
students. I am quite happy to toot Marc’s horn and much less comfortable 
focusing on my own work. In the context of this symposium, however, my 
scholarship is part of his legacy and so it is worth at least a brief mention of how 
he influenced it. Most obviously, my writing is laced with cites to his writing. 
I tip my hat several times to Marc in my article, How Will Lawyering and 
Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?57 Adapting his term, 
“litigotiation,”58 I coined the term “liti-mediation” culture, referring to 
situations in which it is “taken for granted that mediation is the normal way to 
end litigation.”59 The discussion of liti-mediation phenomena is inspired by a 
socio-legal analysis of how the relationships between lawyers, mediators, and 
parties affect the dynamics in mediation and the mediation market.60 It also 
reflects a skepticism of orthodox doctrine (in this case, doctrine of mediation 
practice) and a descriptive and normative preference for a pluralist 
perspective.61 
In an article derived from my dissertation, I documented business lawyers’ 
and (especially) executives’ “failing faith” in litigation, reflecting the “jaundiced 
view” that Galanter writes about.62 Galanter’s writing style clearly influenced 
how I painted the portraits of my subjects.63  My hopes for improving litigation 
and cautions about institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution are in 
the voice of a pragmatic idealist, like Galanter, rather than that of a Cassandra 
or a cheerleader.64 
More recently, I playfully turned the tables on the master by using 
Galanter’s own words and methods to contest parts of his thesis in his 
“Vanishing Trial” report, which documents an ongoing decrease in trial rates.65 I 
note that the “vanishing trial” has become so much a part of conventional 
wisdom that “even as sharp a skeptic as [law-and-society pioneer] Lawrence 
Friedman can be seduced by the mythical language, referring, in passing, to ‘the 
mass extinction of trials’ as if it is an indisputable fact.”66 To challenge this 
contemporary “myth,” I created a Galanter-esque phrase and acronym, “the 
phenomenon known as the vanishing trial (‘TPKATVT’),” and amassed a 
variety of sources of data to bolster my argument.67 My article takes Galanter’s 
report to task for falling prey to a legal centralist perspective and advocates 
 
 57. See Lande, Lawyering and Mediation Practices, supra note 3. 
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 63. See id. at 48–54. 
 64. See id. at 54–68. 
 65. See Lande, I Learned Almost Everything From Marc Galanter, supra note 3. 
 66. See id. at 195–96 (footnotes omitted). 
 67. See id. at 191, 193–99. 
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using, instead, Galanter’s concept of the “ecology” of conflict resolution.68 
These are but a few of many possible illustrations of how Marc’s work helps 
animate my scholarship.69 
 68. See id. at 199–212. 
 69. One of my articles was recently named as the article that best advanced understanding in the 
field of ADR in 2007. See Int’l Inst. of Conflict Prev. and Resol., CPR 2007 Award Winners, 
http://www.cpradr.org/CMS_disp.asp?page=awards-guidelines2005&M=1.7 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) 
(citing John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes,  
22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619 (2007)). Marc Galanter deserves some credit for this achievement, 
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